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Annual Report of the Electric Power Committee
Abstract

This is the annual report of the Electric Power Committee for 1979. It reports on legislative and judicial
developments, and issues relevant to the Electric Power Committee. This report is in four parts. Part I reviews
the extensive developments during 1978 under the federal air and water pollution laws. Part II briefly
considers other federal developments of significance to the electric power industry. Part III is an update of last
year's review of developments concerning solar energy. Part IV consists of the 1978 reports from selected
states.
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ELECTRICAL POWER COMMITTEE*

Part I
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AND
CLEAN WATER ACTS

A. Clean Air Act Developments
Developments in 1978 under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 1 affecting electric
utilities centered on rulemaking activity by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) implementing various major provisions of the 1977 Amendments to the CAA. Those provisions involved, for example, air quality
criteria and standards, prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), new
source performance standards (NSPS), and nonattainment provisions.
Other developments concerned the litigation resulting from that rulemaking
activity and from EPA enforcement and other actions under the pre-1977
regulation framework.
1. Air Quality Criteria and Standards
EPA is preparing to review its national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) for sulfur oxides (SOx) and is moving to set short-term nitrogen
dioxide (N0 2) ambient standards pursuant to requirements in the 1977
Amendments 2 to the CAA. As for SOx, EPA is updating its Air Quality
Criteria Document for SOx. A National Academy of Science report de-

·This report is in four parts. Part I reviews the extensive developments during 1978 under
the federal air and water pollution laws. Part II briefly considers other federal developments of
significance to the electric power industry. Part III is an update of last year's review of
developments concerning solar energy. Part IV consists of the 1978 reports from selected
states.
'42 U.S.c. §§ 7401-7642.
'EPA is required by § 109(c) to set such ambient standards unless it finds, based on the
short-term NO, air quality criteria it must develop, that there is "no significant evidence that
such a standard for such a period is requisite to protect public health." 42 U.S.c. § 7409(c).
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signed to be a source document in this effort has just been published. 3
EPA's November 30, 1978, Regulatory Agenda (November Regulatory
Agenda) indicates that the EPA intends to issue any proposed revisions to
the NAAQS for S02 by May 1980, and any final revisions by December
1980.'
As for the short-term N0 2 NAAQS, EPA was expected to propose a standard in late 1978 but did not do so by year-end. EPA's November
Regulatory Agenda indicates that the agency intends to issue any proposed
standards by January 1979, and final regulations by June 1979, although
the actual date of proposal is more likely to be in the late spring or early
summer.' These new standards, once promulgated, may well create new
nonattainment areas requiring emission rollbacks for existing power stations and emission offsets for new power stations.
EPA is also reviewing its NAAQS for particulates and plans to issue any
proposed and final revisions by May and December 1980, respectively.6
Previous litigation had established that the proper vehicle for forcing
revision of EPA standards is a petition to EPA, followed by (1) a lawsuit in
district court, if necessary to compel a response or (2) a lawsuit in the court
of appeals (in those cases where review of the action in question normally
lies in the court of appeals) to contest the merits of the response. 7 Several
significant decisions were issued at the district court level in 1978. One
ordered EPA to issue an NAAQS for lead by a date certain. 8 Another refused on grounds of mootness to render a declaratory judgment that EPA
had delayed unreasonably in responding to an oil industry petition for
review and revision of the air quality criteria and NAAQS for
photochemical oxidants once EPA had published (on June 9, 1978) a revised criteria document and proposed amendments to the NAAQS.9 In a
third case the district court ruled it has jurisdiction under the citizen suit
provisions to require EPA to review its air quality criteria document for
particulates. In its opinion the court noted that EPA's duty to review is
mandatory but that its duty to revise is discretionary and that a failure to
revise could only be challenged in a court of appeals. '0
In an appellate case concerning attainment dates the Sixth Circuit ruled
that Congress did not set a rigid mid-I97S attainment date for achieving

'9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1772 (Cum. Dev.).
'43 Fed. Reg. 56158. Consolidated Coal Co. petitioned EPA on January 17, 1978, to
review and revise the NAAQS for SOx by doubling the SO, standards. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
1731-1732 (Cum. Dev.).
'/d.
old. The American Iron & Steel Institute has petitioned EPA to review and revise the
NAAQS for particulates.
'Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribes v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'NRDC v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 12 E.R.C. 1509 (D.D.C. 1978).
"American Iron & Steel Institute v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1008 (W.O. Pa. 1978).
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NAAQS. II Hence a later date could be approved by EPA as long as it was
no later than three years from the date of EPA approval of the state implementation plan (SIP) or of a SIP revision. The court rejected a utility
industry argument that EPA's approval of the new attainment date was invalid because attainment by that date was infeasible. The court cited Union
Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agencyl2 for the proposition that
the Administrator cannot reject a SIP on grounds of technological infeasibility.
2. State Implementation Plans (SIP)
Litigation concerning SIPs in 1978 has centered on the Ohio SIP's S02 requirements. In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Environmental Protection Agencyl) the Sixth Circuit upheld EPA's selection of a computer
model (the Real-Time Air-Quality-Simulation Model or RAM) to establish
the S02 emissions limitations for sources in urban areas in the EPApromulgated S02 provisions of the Ohio SIP. 14 This model was developed
by EPA to produce individually calculated emission limitations necessary to·
meet ambient standards, in response to petitioners' complaints that the
"rollback" model, used in the initial Ohio SIP, failed to do so, resulting in
unnecessary overcontrol. I ' The court rejected petitioners' argument that its
consultant, Enviroplan, had a more accurate model, because Enviroplan
refused (on grounds of proprietary interest) to disclose the operative details
of its model for EPA review and evaluation. 16 In the absence of such disclosure and evaluation, the court ruled that the Enviroplan model was not
"available technology." I 7
The court recognized that the record did not contain "positive proofs of
the accuracy of RAM's predictions." 18 Even so, the court noted, after considering evidence bearing on the over and under prediction of RAM, that
even if RAM did over predict, "such a conservative approach in protection
of health and life was apparently contemplated by Congress in requiring
that EPA plans contain 'emission limitations ... necessary to insure attainment and maintenance.' "19
"Northern Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1978).
"427 U.S. 246 (1976).
"572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978).
"Ohio had never itself set SO, emissions limitations. Its initial SIP was set aside and
remanded by the Sixth Circuit because EPA had not complied with the "notice and comment"
rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act when granting its approval.
Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) (Buckeye Power I). Because of
Ohio's long record of delay and default, the court refused to defer to the state's request that it
reject the SIP provisions promulgated by EPA and rely on the state to develop SO, provisions
in the future.
"/d. at 1160.
"/d. at 1163.
"/d.
"/d.
"/d. at 1164 (emphasis added by the court).
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The court also ruled that EPA did not need to allow cross-examination
rights when promulgating the SIP provisions, since this rulemaking action
was not required by the statute to be "on the record."20 The court noted
that the Ninth Circuit had provided for cross-examination in its remand in
Bunker Hill Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency.21 That case involved
a "highly complex and technical issue concerning the technological infeasibility of the use of sulfur burners to . . . control . . . lead smelter emissions."22 Although the Sixth Circuit indicated that it might itself require
cross-examination of an agency's experts in a proper case, it said that petitioners in this case had had ample opportunity to participate fully, particularly in light of the court's prior remand in Buckeye Power Il2l to allow
their further participation.
In a follow-on case the Sixth Circuit upheld most aspects of the computer
model (MAXT-24) which EPA chose for setting SIP emission limitations in
rural and complex terrain areas. In particular it upheld EPA's refusal to use
a widely recognized terrain adjustment factor for hilly terrain, the "halfterrain height displacement theory." That theory was recommended by
petitioners, a number of experts in the field, and had been used by EPA·
itself in approving revisions to another SIP. 24 EPA had developed a different adjustment factor. While neither factor had been validated through
field studies, and while the court expressly did not reject the petitioners'
theory, it could not find the EPA choice arbitrary or capricious. The court
also refused to reject the EPA model because it was not calibrated or
because some actual monitor readings indicated that it overpredicted. B
The court did, however, reverse EPA in one aspect of the modeling, the
use of a certain coefficient for atmospheric stability conditions associated
with gusty winds (Class A stability conditions) which was a critical assumption in the case of one-third of the Ohio power plants being modeled. The
coefficient had been judged unrealistic by experts in the field, including
those attending a Specialists' Conference at the Argonne National
Laboratory sponsored by EPA itself in February 1977. In the face of this
apparent technical consensus, the court remanded the issue to EPA for further study, despite the agency's argument that it was entitled to use the coefficient until further studies could be done to substantiate the theories since
there was, according to the agency, "no experimental or field data to justify

'Old. at 1158-59.

"572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
"572 F.2d at 1160. The court also doubted the Bunker Hill court's view that an EPApromulgated SIP must be economically and technically feasible, noting that this was an open
question after Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 261 n.7 (1976). The court said, in any
case, that the record in the Cleveland Electric case showed no deficiency in that regard. /d. at
1164.
"Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 525 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1975).
"Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F .2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 665.
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changing the dispersion curves or to determine how the dispersion equations
should be changed. "26
In a series of cases attempting to force SIP revisions 27 the courts have
held that district courts have jurisdiction under the citizen suit provisions to
require that EPA make a decision on a requested SIP revision duty, but that
they have no jurisdiction over the content of the decision. 28 While both
courts found the section 304 citizen suit, the Mandamus Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grounds for jurisdiction easy to dispose
of, on the question of district court review of the merits of an SIP revision
decision, both struggled with the applicability of section 1331 federal question jurisdiction. Each finally concluded that early intervention on the
merits by a district court, before final agency action, would be inappropriate where Congress granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction
once that final action had occurred.
In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle 29 several nonprofit business
and industry foundations and numerous Connecticut municipalities have
brought a class action on behalf of all inhabitants of that state seeking to
abate the effects in Connecticut of air pollutants emitted beyond the state's
borders. The suit, which originally named representatives of EPA, the state
of New York, the state of New Jersey, and Long Island Lighting Company
(LILCO) as defendants, presents issues that are unique in several respects.
This is one of the first environmental cases in which a plaintiff has complained not only of adverse health and aesthetic effects of out-of-state emissions but also of adverse economic effects. Connecticut businesses and industry are concerned that emissions from New York and Connecticut
thwart Connecticut's economic growth by preventing emissions by Connecticut industry and business of pollutants within limits established by EPA.
In effect, the court is being asked to apportion among the states the right to
pollute the air.
Plaintiffs assert that New York and New Jersey have failed to promulgate
and enforce implementation plans adequate to prevent adverse pollution effects in Connecticut. The suit requests that EPA be required to promulgate
adequate plans for those states and to terminate federal grants to New York
under the CAA. Plaintiffs further assert the violation of their Ninth
26ld. at 663, quoting EPA's brief at 48-49. In related litigation, an Ohio state court ruled
that variances to ambient air quality standards could not extend, under Ohio law, beyond the
attainment date upheld in Northern Ohio Lung Ass'n, note 11, supra. Cleveland Electric Ill.
Co. v. Williams, 12 E.R.C. 1081 (Ohio Court of Appeals, Franklin County Circuit, 1977).
"See text accompanying note 6 supra for analogous cases involving attempts to require
EPA review and revision of air quality criteria and standards.
"Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (one judge dissenting in
part, essentially on the grounds that a nondiscretionary duty to revise, which is reviewable in
district court, can arise if the agency's failure to do so is clearly wrong on the merits); Dow
Chemical Co. v. Costle, 11 E.R.C. 2064 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that until a state has taken
all the necessary steps to present a complete SIP revision request to EPA, no suit lies in district
court to require EPA to act at all).
"No. H-78-414 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 9, 1978).
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Amendment right to a clean environment and the CAA's abrogation of the
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses
because of the inequality of its effects among states.
Of equal interest to utilities is the plaintiffs' federal common law
nuisance claim seeking to enjoin LILCO from burning high-sulfur fuel.
This claim will at least partially determine, for the first time, the ~'elation
ship between the federal common law of nuisance and the CAA pursuant to
which LILCO has received the approval of both New York and EPA to
burn the high-sulfur fuel. LILCO has argued, inter alia, that the CAA
preempts the federal common law of nuisance and that only a state has
standing to assert such a claim.
3. Prevention oj Significam Deterioration (PSD)
EPA published its final PSD regulations on June 19,1978,30 and they were
promptly appealed by both industry and environmental groups.31 Even
before their promulgation, litigation had begun concerning their "effective
date." The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
consolidated all of the related PSD litigation and divided it, for purposes of
briefing, into two phases-phase one involving the "effective date" issues
and phase two involving the remaining procedural and substantive issues.
The phase one issues were briefed and argued first, in the fall of 1978.
EPA had chosen to apply its new regulations as of March 1, 1978, a choice
supported by the utility industry litigants. Other industry groups argued
that the new rules could not be made effective until states revised their SIPs
by July 1, 1979. Environmental groups argued that Congress intended the
provisions of the new regulations to apply as of August 7, 1977, the date of
enactment of the Amendments.
The initial briefs in phase two of the litigation were submitted in midDecember, 1978. A wide range of issues was raised. Various industry petitioners argued that:
1. ThePSD increments were not intended by Congress to be enforced
like ambient standards and were i.mproperly promulgated.
2. The PSD baseline determination date was supposed to be the date of
the first PSD application in an area, not August 7, 1977, the date of
enactment of the 1977 Amendments.
3. While the statute directs the use of fictitious stack heights for a plant
at the time it is licensed, EPA cannot(a) use fictitious stack heights to calcUlate the amount and location
of PSD increment consumption by other sources at the time of
initial PSD licensing of the plant, nor can it

'°43 Fed. Reg. 26380.
"For a detailed discusion of the evolution of the PSD provisions of the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments and of EPA's response to them, see the Joint Statement of the Case by Industry
Petitioners in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, Nos. 78-1006 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir.).
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(b) use fictitious stack heights to calculate later the actual amount
and location of PSD increment consumption by the plant itself.
4. EPA should not have required use of a boiler-by-boiler approach to
its "commenced construction" rules and should not have required
that construction commence on each phase of a multiunit project
within 18 months of the projected and approved commencement date
for the phase in question.
5. EPA improperly failed in its final PSD regulations to respond to
criticism during the comment period of its Proposed Criteria for Acceptable Air Quality Modeling.
6. EPA improperly defined "potential to emit" with reference to uncontrolled, rather than controlled emissions.
7. EPA improperly defined "major emitting facilities" by including
operations, mobile sources and temporary sources, and by improperly including aggregations of minor emissions points.
8. EPA improperly included operations producing fugitive dust such as
mines, farms, forests, and oil fields within its "major emitting
facilities" definition, and even if these sources are properly included,
EPA's regulations are arbitrary for various reasons.
9. EPA should have provided that a "major modification" occurs
under the Act only where the modification increases net emissions.
10. EPA should have included fuel switches within the baseline, so that
they did not consume the increments.
II. EPA should not have applied the PSD requirements to pollutants
other than S02 and particulates.
12. The PSD permit process should have been limited to sources located
in clean air areas and should not have been extended to sources
located in "nonattainment areas."
13. EPA should not have included a visible emission standard in "best
available control technology" (BACT) requirements.
The Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund argued that:
(I) EPA had improperly exempted certain stationary sources (those involving
use of the "bubble concept," those with the potential to emit less than 50
tons per year, and fugitive dust sources) from full preconstruction PSD
review.
(2) EPA should have required one year's monitoring data for all pollutants
regulated by the Clean Air Act in order to determine compliance with PSD
increments (not just for pollutants for which there exists a national ambient
air quality standard and then only for determination of compliance with the
ambient standards) and has failed, within one year of the enactment of the
1977 Amendments (as the Amendments required), to promulgate regulations detailing conditions under which less than one year's monitoring is
adequate.
(3) Ex parte influence by the President and his advisors rendered the 50-ton and
fugitive dust exemptions illegal.
(4) The provisions for revision of SIPs are inadequate to ensure maintenance of
the PSD increments.
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EPA is currently moving toward new rules for the industry's petitioners
first point concerning the promulgation of PSD increments for pollutants
other than S02 and total suspended particulates (proposal by December
1979, and final promulgation by October 1980, according to EPA's November Regulatory Agenda).

4. Nonattainment Area Requirements
EPA adopted its final emission offset policy for use in nonattainment areas,
without any further comment period, on January 16, 1979. 32 Some items
were left open for further comment. 33
EPA's policy governs applications for certain new sources in nonattainment areas submitted before July 1, 1979, or within the time allowed for
development of a revised SIP for areas designated nonattainment after the
initial designations under section 107. For permit applications submitted
after those dates, the provisions of the revised state SIP will govern if the
SIP meets the nonattainment requirements (Part D) of the CAA. If the SIP
does not meet these requirements, the source may not be constructed at all,
with the exception of cases where the only nonattainment impact is across a
state line, in which case the EPA policy applies.
5. Steam-Electric New Source Performance Standards
Proposed new source performance standards (NSPS) for SOlt TSP, and
NO, were announced on September 19, 1978. J4 EPA is considering a
number of alternatives, including EPA Staff recommendations, certain
Department of Energy (DOE) options and industry proposals. Since final
regulations (anticipated by March 1979) will be applicable retroactively to
the date of publication of the EPA notice, the notice sets forth the
regulatory text of the most stringent proposals (those of the EPA Staff) in
order to notify industry of the most severe requirements to which it might
be subject.
The EPA Staff, DOE, and industry proposals are as follows:
1. The EPA Staff proposed 85 percent removal of S02 emissions regardless of input sulfur with a 0.2 Ibs/MBTU floor. (Compliance would be
monitored based on a 24-hour average of emissions with three daily exemptions per month, none below 75 percent.) The standard for particulates would be 0.03 Ibs/MBTU, and for NO" 0.6 and 0.5 lbsl
MBTU for bituminous and sub-bituminous coals, respectively.
2. DOE proposed 85 percent removal of S02 but with a floor of 0.8
Ibs/MBTU. (Compliance would be based on a 3~-day average of emissions.) The particulate standard would be 0.05 to 0.08 Ibs/MBTU.

"44 Fed. Reg. 3274.
"[d. at 3298.
"43 Fed. Reg. 42154.
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3. The industry proposed a sliding scale for percentage removal ranging
from 20 percent to 85 percent depending upon the sulfur content of the
coal burned. (Compliance would be based on a 30-day average of
emissions.) Particulate emissions limits would be 0.08 Ibs/MBTU, and
NO x limits would remain at 0.7 Ibs/MBTU.
Continuous monitoring requirements are part of the proposed NSPS. There
is also a separate continuous monitoring rulemaking underway for existing
sources. JS

6. Tall Stack Regulations
EPA published proposed rules implementing the "good engineering practice" (GEP) provisions of section 123 of the 1977 Amendments on January
12, 1979. 36 These regulations establish a defined "GEP" stack height as the
maximum stack height for which a source may be given credit in establishing its emission limitation in the applicable SIP. The November Regulatory
Agenda lists April 1979 as the target date for final tall stack regulations.
7. Visibility Protection Guidelines
EPA is required, by section 169A of the 1977 Amendments, to prepare a
report to Congress on "Visibility Protection," but has not yet done so. On
February 8, 1978, the Department of the Interior identified virtually all
mandatory Class I federal areas as areas "where visibility is an important
value."37 By October 1979 EPA plans to publish proposed guidelines for
application by state SIPs of "best available retrofit technology" (BART) to
certain major stationary sources. 38 These guidelines are to be in final form
by August 1980. J9 Under section 169A(c) fossil-fuel fired generating power
plants with a total generating capacity in excess of 750 megawatts may be
exempted from these requirements if they can demonstrate that they do not
and will not, by themselves or in combination with other sources, "emit any
air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to
significant impairment of visibility in any such area."
8. Toxic Substance Regulations
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States40 the Supreme Court held that
"work practice" rules promulgated under the hazardous air pollutant provisions of section 112 of the CAA are not "emission standards" under that
section since emission standards must be set on a quantitative basis. In so
doing, it rejected the government's argument that section 307(b)(2) of the
"See November Regulatory Agenda, 43 Fed. Reg. at 56163.
"44 Fed. Reg. 2608.
37
43 Fed. Reg. 7721 (Feb. 24, 1978).
"November Regulatory Agenda, note 35 supra.
"Id.
'°434 U.S. 275 (1978), II E.R.C. !O81.
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CAA, \yhich prohibits review in an enforcement proceeding of section 112
emission standards, precludes the defendant in a criminal enforcement action from asserting as a defense that the section 112 "emission standard"
alleged to be violated is not an emission standard within the meaning of the
CAA.

9. Enforcement
Adamo Wrecking4l held that section 307(b)(2) does not bar the defense that
the section 112 emission standard being enforced is not an emission standard within the meaning of the CAA.
While the courts have generally held that preenforcement review of
notices of violation and enforcement orders is not available, a district court
in Philadelphia recently allowed review of a notice of violation (NOV).42 In
a narrow opinion, the court found federal question jurisdiction over a suit
filed to have a preexisting consent order declared valid and an EPA-issued
NOV declared illegal. The court distinguished West Penn Power Co. v.
Train 43 and assumed jurisdiction because (1) the issuance of the NOV constituted final agency action since the CAA Amendments require that once
this occurs an enforcement action must follow, and (2) the legality of the
consent order raises legal issues appropriate for judicial review.
Courts have generally refused to stay enforcement of SIP provisions
pending exhaustion of state appellate processes challenging the promulgation of the SIP. Yet, in Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency" a district court allowed preenforcement review and stayed EPA
enforcement of violations of S02 emission limitations while the plaintiff in
good faith sought a variance under state procedure.
10. Judicial Review
In Adamo Wrecking the Supreme Court reaffirmed that section 307(b)(2)
precludes a court from undertaking full review of the procedural or substantive validity of a rule subject to that section during criminal enforcement proceedings. In other litigation, a district court dismissed a petition of
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenging EPA's PSD regulations under the citizen suit provisions, holding that final PSD regulations
are reviewable in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia under section 307(b)(I).4s In Amoco Oil Co. v. United States 46 a
district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 133 I (a) over a

"Id.
"Philadelphia Electric v. Costle, No. 78-4170 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
"522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975).
"450 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mo., Mar. 16, 1978). This case was recently reversed by the
Eighth Circuit. Slip Op. No. 78-1357 (8th Cir. 1979).
"Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 448 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C., 1978), 11 E.R.C.
2073, appeal pending.
"450 F. Supp. 185, 11 E.R.C. 1693 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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challenge to the agency's interpretation of an otherwise valid section 211
regulation. The court recognized that an attack on the validity of the regulation is reviewable only in a court of appeals.
B. Clean Water Act (CW A) Developments

1. Effluent Limitations Guidelines
The EPA continued its development of thermal effluent limitations guidelines during 1978 in response to the courts remand order in Appalachian
Power Co. v. Train. 47 Development regulations under section 403(c) setting
ocean discharge criteria is also proceeding slowly. The November Regulatory Agenda estimates proposed regulations by April 1979, and final regulations by December 1979. The EPA also continued its review of "best
available technology" (BAT) requirements and effluent limitations
guidelines for toxic substances for the steam-electric category pursuant to
the settlement agreement in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train. 48 The November Regulatory Agenda lists proposed regulations in
May 1979 and final regul~tions in December 1979.
There were new developments in the National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train (now National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle)
litigation. NRDC filed a motion, on September 26, 1978, to "show cause"
why EPA should not be held in contempt of court for allegedly failing to
comply with four paragraphs of the settlement agreement. NRDC also requested that the settlement agreement be significantly modified in several
respects. EPA responded, justifying in detail its actions under the settlement agreement, and intervenors responded, moving to vacate the June:8,
1976, consent decree on the ground that it had been superseded by the toxic's regulatory program in the 1977 Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (1977 Amendments). After negotiations between
NRDC and EPA and comments by intervenors, NRDC and EPA filed a
Joint Motion for Modification of Settlement on December 15, 1978. The
Joint Motion adopted the new rulemaking schedule advocated by EPA and
adopts new language (1) concerning a program for pretreatment regulations
for pollutants other than the sixty-five listed in the 1977 Amendments; and
(2) relating to promulgation of water quality standards. Intervenors filed an
opposition to the Joint Motion, arguing that the 1977 Amendm~nts
superseded the consent decree and that modification of the decree as proposed by EPA and NRDC would violate the rulemaking and 'public parCWA,
ticipation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,- tii~
•t\
EPA Regulations, and the Due Process Clause. The settlement agreement
continues to reserve to the parties the right to later litigate the validity of
any programs required by it.
..
"545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
"S E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Appalachian Power Co. v. Train 49 required EPA to promulgate new
"best practical technology" (BPT) variance regulations for the steam-electric category. In March 1978, EPA finally proposed an "amendment" to its
steam-electric BPT variance provision, in order to implement the court's
order.50 The only changes proposed were (I) a statement that the August 20,
1974, opinion of EPA's.General Counsel, that costs could not be considered
under its standard variance clause, would not apply to power plants; and (2)
a new interpretation of the phrase "other such factors" to include "significant cost differentials and the factors listed in section 301(c) of the Act."
EPA's final rule was virtually identical to its March proposal. H EPA rejected industry comments suggesting that its proposed regulation was inconsistent with the Appalachian Power decision because it failed to include all
of the section 304(b)(I)(B) factors as required by that decision, specifically
"total cost ... in relation to effluent reduction benefits." The agency also
rejected NRDC comments that the factors listed in section 301(c) concerning economic capability in granting variances to the BAT requirements
could not be considered in the BPT variance provision. The resulting litigation was transferred to and consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and is pending. 52 In addition to the issues raised
during the comment period, NRDC argues that section 301(1) of the Clean
Water Act forbids the application ofthe BPT variance to effluent limitation
regulations for toxic pollutants.
The EPA debated internally during 1978 whether a "bubble policy"
should be applied to BAT, BCT, BPT, and water quality standards. 53
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle 54 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld effluent limitations guidelines regulations for the
pulp and paper industry. The court dealt extensively with the proper scope
of review of EPA action, adopting a differential stance on factual or
"policy" determinations, a less differential stance on issues of statutory interpretation, and a relatively independent stance on procedural issues. The
court ruled that receiving water quality is not a permissible consideration in

"545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
'°43 Fed. Reg. 8812-13 (1978). In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, No. 74-2366 (4th
Cir., filed July 14, 1978) Commonwealth Edison, a petitioner in Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, note 49, supra, petitioned the court to enforce its Appalachian Power mandate ordering
EPA to promulgate a valid BPT variance clause and to enjoin EPA enforcement actions until
EP A had complied with the mandate, had allowed petitioner to present a variance request, and
had acted on that request. By order dated August 28, 1978, the court denied this petition
without prejudice to its later renewal.
"43 Fed. Reg. 43023 (Sept. 22, 1978).
"Appalachian Power Co., et al. v. Costle, No. 74-2096, and consolidated cases. Similar
arguments are already before the Fourth Circuit in another pending case, Consolidated Coal
Co. v. Costle, No. 76-1690 (4th Cir., filed Aug. 10, 1976).
"The various proposals are described at 9 ENVIR. REP. (Current Developments) 1643-44
and reprinted 9 id at 1659-1665.
"11 E.R.C. 2149 (D.D.C. 1978).
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setting effluent limitations guidelines, since the phrase "effluent reduction
benefits" means those reductions in effluent discharge that occur "whenever less effluent is discharged, i.e., whenever a plant treats its waste before
discharge." By so doing, the court effectively read cost-benefit balancing
out of the Clean Water Act.
The Weyerhaeuser case also upheld the BPT variance regulations for the
paper industry by finding that they could "be applied with enough flexibility to support the general rulemaking effort." The court took no position
on the application of the variance clause in specific cases, nor on its precise
interpretation. It read the BPT variance requirement to mean that a variance need only be granted where' 'the entire impact of a limitation on an individual mill exceeds that which the EPA is authorized to place on the industry. " l l It ruled that "local receiving water quality" cannot be considered when granting variances. Finally, it ruled that while "total cost'"
must be considered in granting BPT variances, "the difficulty, or in fact the
inability, of the operator to absorb the costs need not control the variance
decision," indicating that it reached that conclusion "only after satisfying
[itself] that the legislative intent is as clear as the result is harsh."
In Republic Steel v. Costle' 6 the Sixth Circuit overruled its previous decision in Republic Steel v. Train l7 where it had granted an extension of the
1977 BPT deadline because of EPA's failure to promulgate final BPT regulations on a timely basis. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court
held that section 309(a)(5)(B) of the amended CW A establishes the only
mechanism for granting BPT deadline extensions.

2. Section 311 Hazardous Substance Regulations
EPA promulgated hazardous pollutant regulations under section 311 on
March 13, 1978. These regulations were set aside by district court in
Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n v. Costle" on three grounds:
1. EPA exceeded its authority in attempting to regulate point source
discharges under section 311 where the discharger possesses an
NPDES permit;
2. The manner in which EPA established harmful quantities was inconsistent with statutory criteria; and
3. EPA's determination that 261 of the 271 designated hazardous substances are not removable was arbitrary and capricious.
EPA subsequently moved to stay the provisions of the district court's decision relating to reporting under section 311, but this motion was denied. '9

"Id. at 2165, n.34.
" _ F.2d _ , II E.R.C. 2041 (6th Cir. 1978).
"557 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1977).
"451 F. Supp. 902, II E.R.C. 1792 (W.O. La. 1978).
"Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n Y. Costie, 12 E.R.C. 1327 (W.O. La. 1978).
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Congress then adopted amendments to section 311 which clarified the
relationship between that section and the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit provisions of the CW A. As stated by
Senator Muskie, on the one hand, "chronic discharges" associated with
manufacturing and treatment technology are to be regulated under sections
402 and 309. On the other hand, "classic spill" situations occurring at a
facility with an NPDES permit will be subject to section 311, once EPA has
promulgated new regulations under that provision. In addition, the amendments simplify the standards for setting harmful quantities and for assessing penalties under section 311. Significantly, they provide for the recovery,
under section 309(b), of clean-up costs incurred in connection with a
discharge excluded from section 311 by the new NPDES exception.
Four cases in 1978 dealt with liability for clean-up costs under section
311. In United States v. MIY Big Sam 60 the court held that limitations on
liability for clean-up costs under section 311 do not preclude the government from maintaining a suit under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 to
recover clean-up costs in excess of the section 311 liability limits. In Tug
Ocean Prince v. United States 6 ' the court reversed a finding by the district
court that the oil spill in question resulted from errors of navigation and
management on board the tug and not from matters within the tugboat
owner's privity and knowledge. The court found that the tugboat owner
had failed to supervise properly the operation of the boat (by its failure to
require a lookout, failure to designate a captain, and failure to inform the
pilot of the copilot's unfamiliarity with the river) and that these omissions
constituted "willful misconduct" ~ithin the meaning of section 311(f)(1).
Thus, the court found that the district court erroneously limited the tugboat
owner's clean-up cost liability under section 311(f)(1). In a third case62 the
Fourth Circuit followed United States v. LeBeou! Bros. Towing Co., Inc. 63
and rejected a corporation's argument that civil penalties under section 311
are criminal in nature and that its notification to the government of the spill
was entitled to "use immunity" under section 1321(b)(5). The court ruled
that a corporation is not entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and that the scope of "use immunity" under section
31l(b)(5) was intended to extend only to criminal cases, not to penalties
specifically denominated by Congress as "civil penalties." One judge, in a
brief concurrence, noted that "different considerations might well arise in
the application of [these provisions] to an individual as contrasted to a corporation. "64 Finally, a district court upheld imposition of substantial, as

'°454 F. Supp. 1144. II E.R.C. 1741 (E.D. La. 1978).
"12 E.R.C. 1010 (2d Cir. 1978).
"United States v. Allied Towing Co., 578 F.2d 978, 12 E.R.C. 1305 (4th Cir. 1978).
"537 F.2d 149,9 E.R.C. 1118 (5th Cir. 1976).
"United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., II E.R.C. 1437 (E.D. Ill. 1978) affirmed, 12
E.R.C. 1588 (7th Cir. 1978).
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opposed to nominal, section 311(b)(6) penalties on a pipeline owner for a
rupture and oil spill caused by a third party, notwithstanding defendant's
lack of fault. 6l

3. Water Quality Criteria, Standards, and Planning
EPA is required by the settlement agreement in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train 66 to develop water quality criteria for the sixty-five
toxic pollutants listed there. EPA actively circulated draft criteria documents during 1978 and the industry commented on these. The November
Regulatory Agenda indicates that criteria for twenty-nine of these are to be
proposed in March 1979, for final adoption by September 1979. The remaining thirty-six criteria are to be proposed in July 1979, and adopted by
December 1979.
On May 18, 1978, EPA proposed new guidelines containing a new methodology for deriving water quality criteria for the protection of aquatic
life. 67 Those guidelines were not further proposed or finally adopted during
1978.
On July 10, 1978, EPA published a statement describing its current policy
regarding state water quality standards under section 303 of the Act and an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this question. 68 The three
major changes the EPA proposed to its policy were (1) adoption of more
stringent criteria which must be met before water quality use designations
can be "downgraded"; (2) intensification of EPA efforts to encourage
states to "upgrade" use designations; and (3) requiring that state water
quality standards be promulgated for specified pollutants. EPA's
November Regulatory Agenda indicates that final implementing regulations
on these policy issues were due to be proposed in late 1978 and published in
final form in early 1979, although no action was taken in 1978 and none has
been taken to date in 1979.
EPA's proposed tightening of its water quality standards policy may have
been at least partially influenced by the case of Stream Pollution Control
Board v. Alexander. 69 There the court concluded that the Administrator has
authority under section 303(c)(4)(B) to promulgate federal water quality
standards at any point in time when the Administrator determines that a
state's standards do not measure up to the requirements of the CW A. The
court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary and permanent injunction
restraining EPA from promulgating, pursuant to section 303(c)(4), federal
water quality standards to supersede portions of the state's standards disapproved by EPA pursuant to section 303(c)(3). In dictum, the court concluded that the 90-day review period under section 303(c)(3) begins to run
·'United States v. Texas Pipeline Co .• II E.R.C. 1465 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
··8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
·'43 Fed. Reg. 21506 (1978).
·'43 Fed. Reg. 29588-29592 (I978) .
•' _ F. Supp. _ . II E.R.C. 1564 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
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only when the state has submitted all relevant information and not simply
from the date when the state first submits its standards.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle 70 the district court held that
EPA has a duty, in the absence of state action, to implement the load analysis provisions of sections 303(d)(I) and (2) of the CWA. The court also
noted that in doing so, EPA would have to comply with section 102(2)(E) of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which studies, develops, and describes alternative methods of controlling salinity, despite the provisions of section
511(c)(I), since the latter section relieves EPA only from the EIS requirement of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.71
On September 20, 1978, EPA published a notice 72 proposing an identification of pollutants suitable for total maximum daily load (TMDL) calculations pursuant to section 304(a)(2)(D) of the CWA. The EPA took this action in response to a court order in Board of County Commissioners of
Calvert County v. Costle. 73 On December 28, 1978, EPA published a final
notice identifying all pollutants, under proper technical conditions, as being
suitable for the calculation of total maximum daily loads. Each state was required, within 180 days after publication of the notice, to submit its first
identification of waters requiring TMDLs and its first load calculations.
In pending litigation several utility companies have appealed a district
court decision finding that EPA regulations" establishing an antidegradation policy under the CW A were not ripe for review and that the electric
utility company plaintiffs, who were within the class regulated by the antidegradation requirement, lack standing. The appellants also asked the court
to decide whether section 308 or section 303, the purported authority for the
challenged regulations, authorize EPA to pursue an anti degradation
policy.7S

4. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Program
EPA undertook wholesale reorganization and reform of its NPDES pro- .
cedural rules in 1978. It circulated drafts of its proposed revisions in February and March. On January 6 the EPA proposed specific revisions concerning (1) implementation of the priority pollutants settlement agreement
requirements; and (2) EPA review of state-issued permits. 76 On May 23,
1

°439 F. Supp. 980, 12 E.R.C. 1131 (D.D.C. 1978).
[d. at 1134.
"43 Fed. Reg. 42303.
"No. 78-0572 (D.D.C.).
14
40 C.F.R. § 130.17, dealing with water quality, which provides that "[e)xisting instream
water uses shall be maintained and protected" and that "[n)o further water quality degradation ... is allowable."
"Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, No. 77-1612 (7th Cir., filed May 25, 1977). The
case has been briefed and argued, but there has been no decision to date.
"43 Fed. Reg. 1256-58 (197·8).
11
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1978, EPA promulgated these regulations in finaUorm 77 and on the same
day proposed to amend them to ensure that holders of NPDES permits
issued in the near future take the steps necessary to comply with the July 1,
1984, BAT deadline for toxic pollutants in the event that no " final [BAT]
regulations" trigger the permit reopener provisions. The proposed amendment provided for two alternative types of NPDES permits where permits
had to be issued before September 30, 1980 for the steam-electric industry:
(1) short-term permits which must expire by September 30, 1980, at which
time new permits incorporating schedules for compliance with case~by-case
BAT limitations for toxics must be issued if no final regulations are in effect;78 and (2) long-term permits issued for the usual five-year term including case-by-case BAT limitations for toxics and BCT limitations and
schedules of compliance for meeting them. These proposed regulations were
made final on December 11, 1978. 79
On August 21, 1978, EPA published proposed new NPDES procedural
regulations. 80 It also published "Interim Final Regulations Implementing
sections 30I(c) and 30I(g) of the Act."81 EPA also published (1) proposed
regulations governing Spill Prevention and Control Countermeasure
(SPCC) plans to prevent discharges of hazardous substances from industrial
facilities; and (2) proposed regulations implementing section 304(e) of the
Act establishing "Criteria and Standards for Imposing Best Management
Practices for Ancillary Industrial Activities. "82 The EPA also plans to
issue, but has not yet proposed, regulations governing the substantive
criteria for section 301(c) and section 301(g) variances from BAT requirements.
EPA's NPDES procedural reform regulations are far-reaching in nature
and were extensively commented on by industry and others during the comment period. They are expected to be promulgated in final form by early
1979.
On November 16 EPA issued public notice of a draft policy guidance
concerning NPDES permit requirements for solid waste disposal facilities in
waters of the United States. 83 This EPA policy, if made final, could be interpreted to require utilities to obtain NPDES permits for ash ponds and
scrubber sludge facilities located in wetlands 84 or in impounded "intermit-

"43 Fed. Reg. 22160.
"Of course, if final SAT regulations for toxics have been published before a short-term
permit expires, the permit would already have been modified, through operation of its
reopener provision, to incorporate. these regulations before September 30, 1980.
19
43 Fed. Reg. 58066.
,old. at 37078.
"43 Fed. Reg. 40859 (Sept. 13, 1978).
"43 Fed. Reg. 39276-84 (Sept. I, 1978).
"43 Fed. Reg. 53495.
"On January 5, 1979, EPA issued a "Statement of Procedures" on floodplain management and wetlands protection. 44 Fed. Reg. 1455.
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tent" or "wet weather" streams or depressions, where the facilities receive
wastes from trucks or other vehicles. No permit would be granted where
there are practicable alternatives which (1) do not involve a discharge into
"waters of the United States" (broadly defined in EPA's existing and proposed procedural regulations) or (2) could be conducted in a manner less
damaging to the affected aquatic ecosystem.
The applicant would have the burden of carrying out a study of all possible
alternatives\ On December 27, 1978, the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) petitioned EPA for rulemaking on this subject, asking that EPA1. define solid waste disposal as a discharge subject to the NPDES permit
program;
2. issue effluent limitation guidelines for the solid waste disposal point
source category; and
3. regulate these activities by permit under section 402.
The NWF urges EPA. to adopt a "zero discharge" approach in light of
alternative means of disposal such as upland sanitary landfills, incineration,
and resource recovery. EPA has taken no action to date.
By letter dated February 28, 1978, the NWF filed a "Petition for
Rulemaking Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act" in which i~
requested that EPA regulate hydroelectric dams as a point source category
under sectipn 402(a) of the CW A. The petition, listing1. low concentrations of dissolved oxygen,
2. high concentrations of heavy metals, and
3. atmospheric gas supersaturation, as problems in discharges from
hydroelectric impoundmep.ts, specifically requested EPA to "designate and set uniform effluent limitations for discharges."
EPA has not yet taken action with respect to the NWF rulemaking petition.
In South Cprolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander 85 a district court
denied a government motion to dismiss a s~it brought to require the Corps
of Engineers -to obtain an NPDES permit:, ..from EPA for the release of impounded water through turbines in a federal hydroelectric dam. The court
found that plaintiff's allegations that the dam causes downstream water
pollution, if true, were a sufficient basis for EPA jurisdiction under section
402. The court noted that release of impounded water, low in oxygen levels
and high in dissolved metals because of impoundment, constituted the
"addition" of pollutants to a navigable water. The court indicated that it
could not hold as a matter of law that the dam and/or its turbines did not
constitute point sources, noting that if plaintiffs made their case at trial, the
project would be a point source:
There was a significant volume of litigation in 1978 affecting the NPDES
system. There are appeals pending in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits of district
court decisions holding that· mine-related pollution such as leachate
" _ F. supp. _.11 E.R.C. 2045 (D.S.C. 1978).
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overflow, rainfall runoff, and drainage from mine pits constitutes nonpoint source pollution and is outside the scope of the NPDES permit program. 86
In Inland Steel Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency87 the Seventh
Circuit held that EPA has authority to issue NPDES permits with
"reopener" provisions which require permit modification to renect toxic
pollutant standards subsequently adopted under section 307(a). EPA's
modification authority rests on section 402(b)(l)(C)(iii) which provides that
the Administrator may issue permits that can be terminated or modified for
cause including, but not limited to, a "change in any condition that requires
either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted
discharge." Section 402(k) does not, according to the court, insulate the
permittee from a mid-term modification to reflect subsequent section 307(a)
toxic standards, but rather ensures that the permittee will not be held in
noncompliance with the new standards unless and until the permit is
modified to include the new standards. EPA has subsequently relied on Inland Steel as authority to issue NPDES permits with a reopener provision
requiring permit modification to reflect effluent limitations and standards
promulgated under sections 301 and 304 for "priority pollutants," as opposed to the toxic pollutant standards under section 307(a) that were at issue
in Inland Steel. In addition EPA maintains that, upon modification to incorporate such subsequently promulgated limitations and standards, a permittee may be forced to comply with all then applicable requirements of the
CWA.
In Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Wisconsin 88 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that unexpire Wisconsin NPDES permits which incorporated effluent limitations based on EPA's interim regulations must be
modified to reflect less stringent BPT limitations adopted by EPA in final
regulations. State law provides that state permit effluent limitations may
not exceed federal effluent limitations, and due process considerations require permit modifications to incorporate final effluent limitations promulgated under formal rulemaking procedures.
In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle 89 the First Circuit continued
the line of cases holding that APA adjudicatory hearing requirements apply
to section 402 proceedings and, in this case, to section 316(a) proceedings.
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States90 a district court held that
state issuance of an NPDES permit and EPA's lack of objection to that issuance do not constitute major federal action under NEP A. A similar issue
"Sierra Club v. Abston Constitution Co., No. 77-2530 (5th Cir., appeal docketed July 28,
1977); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., Nos. 77-1302 and 77-1303 (lOth Cir., filed Mar.
22, 1977).
"574 F.2d 367, Il E.R.C. 1353 (7th Cir. 1978).
"268 N.W.2d 153, Il E.R.C. 2024 (Wis. 1978).
"572 F.2d 872, Il E.R.C. 1358 (1st Cir. 1978).
"453 F. Supp. 122, 11 E.R.C. 1897 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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is pending in litigation in the Tenth Circuit where NRDC is challenging the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's delegation of licensing authority to a
state, arguing that NRC's involvement in the licensing procedure in New
Mexico is, notwithstanding the delegation to the state, sufficient to constitute major federal action so that impact statement requirements are not
eliminated by the delegation. 91
One recent case has dealt with EPA delegation of the NPDES program to
states. In Central Hudson Gas and E/:!ctric v. Environmental Protection
Agency92 the Second Circuit held that a court of appeals does not have
jurisdiction under section 509(b)( 1)(F) of the CW A to review EPA's retention of authority over those NPDES permits in adjudication at the time of
delegation of the NPDES program to the state, since such EPA exercise of
authority is not an agency decision to "issue or deny" permits. The court
went on, however, to resolve the case on the merits, holding that EPA may
maintain authority over permit proceedings on which adjudicatory hearings
had been requested at the point of delegation, notwithstanding the language
of section 402(c)(1) which directs EPA, once a state has taken over administration of the NPDES program, to "suspend the issuance of permits."
A number of decisions have continued the d~velopment of the law
relating to EPA review and judicial review of state-issued NPDES permits.
In Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency93 the Ninth Circuit
held that EPA cannot base its objections to a state NPDES permit on interim guidance documents. The court noted that exercise of the veto power
is "contingent upon the antecedent formulation of guidelines regulations
under section 304(b) in conformity with the rulemaking provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act."
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States 94 a federal district court
held that it had no jurisdiction over a citizen suit challenging the legality of
the Virginia NPDES permit program and EPA approval of that program
since section 509(b)(l) of the CWA gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts
of appeals over EPA approval of state programs. The court also held that it
had no jurisdiction over an EPA failure to object to state issuance of an
NPDES permit, citing previous cases to the same effect. The court said that
EPA's right to object to an individual permit is "totally discretionary and
can be waived completely." It found that the right to object had been
"committed to Agency review," apparently meaning committed to agency
"discretion," and thus found no jurisdiction with regard to these issues.
"Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 12 E.R.C. 1306
(10th Cir. 1978) (allowing private uranium mill operator to intervene in the litigation on
grounds that operator's claimed interest in litigation would not be represented adequately by
existing parties). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle. 12 E.R.C. 1131 (D.D.C.
1978) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss. noting that § 102(2)(E) is independent of and
broader than the EIS requirement of § 102(2)(C) and does not fall within the prohibition of §
511(c)(l».
" _ F.2d _ . 12 E.R.C. 1454 (2d Cir. 1978).
"573 F.2d 583. 11 E.R.C. 1339 (9th Cir. 1978).
"445 F. Supp. 1349, 11 E.R.C. 1475 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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The court in Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency9S ruled
that courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F) to
review an EPA veto of a state-issued permit, noting that jurisdiction over
such a veto lies in federal district court under section 10 of the APA.
In Shell Oil v. Train 96 the court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction
to review state issuance of an NPDES permit and the state's refusal to grant
a BPT variance. Shell had not urged review of the EPA failure to veto the
permit; rather, it had requested review of "affirmative action on the part of
the Administrator in making or causing the Regional Board to make a decision against it. "97 In the words of the court, "In short, Shell's theory is that
EPA 'coercions' transform the actions of the state agency into federal
agency action reviewable in the federal court." Noting that "the Supreme
Court has been "distinctly unwilling to view federal dealings with a state or
state agency as evidencing either coercion or undue influence, "98 the court
rejected Shell's arguments and noted that the existence of a state judicial
forum for review of the state decision forecloses the availability of the
federal forum under the APA. The court noted that "proper respect for
both the integrity and independence of the state administrative mechanism,
mandated by Congress in this context, required that Shell's complaint be
dismissed. "
Judge Wallace dissented, arguing that Shell's complaint alleged EPA action "which is the functional equivalent of the formal veto in Washington
v. EPA." He would therefore have allowed review of this functional veto in
federal district court pursuant to section 10 of the AP A.
Finally, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle 99 the Ninth Circuit held
that an "extention" by EPA of an NPDES permit is an EPA action "issuing or denying" a permit and thus is appealable under section 509(b)(I)(F)
of the CWA. The court noted, however, that in its opinion a "modification" of an EPA permit by EPA is not an "issuance or denial" and thus is
not appealable under that section. The court seems to assume, without comment, that modification of a permit (altering the meaning and scope of only
those provisions modified, as opposed to an extension which affects all provisions of a permit by projecting their life) is not appealable in a court of appeals, but it does not indicate how or where such a modification is appealable.

5. Section 404 Developm~nts
In Parkview Corp. v. Department oj the ArmylOO a district court granted a
preliminary Injunction preventing the Corps and municipai defendants

"513 F.2d 583. 11 E.R.C. 1339 (9th Cir. 1918).
"12 E.R.C. 1541 (9th Cir. 1918).
97 [d. at 1550.
"[d.
" _ F.2d _ . 11 E.R.C. 2125 (9th Cir. 1918).
100
12 E.R.C. 1302 (E.D. Wis. 1918).
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from removing fill, appurtenant structures, and other materials pending a
hearing on the merits, after finding that a Corps compliance order requiring
removal, purportedly issued under section 309 of the CW A, exceeded the
Corps jurisdiction, since that section empowers only EPA to issue enforcement orders. The court did not address the power 'of the court to issue such
an order under section 404(s). The court also noted that the plaintiff had
raised a substantial question as to whether the area in question was located
within a wetlands area as defined by the Corps' own regulations. The plaintiff relied on a version of the Corps' regulations in force at the time the
work in question was begun while the Corps relied on a newer version which
became effective later.

6. Section 5Jl(c)(2) Developments
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been active recently in
interpretation of its role in evaluating aquatic envionmental impacts when
licensing nuclear power plants. In Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)'0' the NRC ruled that it would accept
for purposes of its cost-benefit analyses when licensing nuclear power
plants, without independent inquiry, the EPA determination as to the appropriate cooling system and as to the nonradiological aquatic impacts
associated with that cooling system. Subsequently, an Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board ruled
that NRC permits cannot include nonradiological aquatic monitoring requirements, on the grounds that such requirements overlap EPA's jurisdiction under the CWA and are prohibited by section 511(c)(2) of the CWA
which provides that no other federal agency shall, as a result of its NEPA
jurisdiction, "impose ... any effluent limitation" other than one established by EPA under the CW A. 102
On November 16, 1978, the full Commission exercised its authority to
review, on its own motion, a decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Appeal Board in the Indian Point case '03 in which the Appeal Board had
bowed to staff demands that a May 1, 1982, closed-cycle cooling requirement be retained in the Indian Point licenses. The Appeal Board had rejected requests that this condition be deleted or that the date for closedcycle cooling be made indefinite pending final resolution by EPA under the
NPDES system as to whether closed-cycle cooling is required or not. In
taking up the matter, the NRC asked t.he parties to address two issues: (1)
the implications of the Seabrook decision with respect to closed-cycle cooling at Indian Point Unit No. 2 and existing termination date of May 1,

'·'CLI 78-1, 7 N.R.C. 1 (1978).

'·'Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant), LPB-7-87, 7 N.R.C. 215,
231 (1978); Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nulear Plant), ALAB-515 (Dec. 27,
1978).
'·'ALAB-487, 8 N,R.C. 69 (1978).
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1982, for once-through cooling; and (2) to what extent the Indian Point
license condition imposing closed-cycle cooling should be modified to take
proper account of EPA's authority. These issues have now been briefed and
await disposition by the Commission.

7. Enforcement
EPA announced important new enforcement policy initiatives on April 11,
1978.'°'
There was considerable enforcement litigation under the CW A in 1978.
South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander los held that EPA has a
mandatory duty under section 309(a)(3) to issue a compliance order once it
finds a violation of the CW A, but has no mandatory duty to bring a civil or
criminal enforcement action in the courts.
A number of cases deal with the effect of failure by EPA to take certain
steps during the enforcement process. In United States v. City of Colorado
Springsl06 the district court ruled that lack of 30-day notice to the city and
state in accordance with section 309(a)(l) of the CW A does not entitle the
city defendant to dismissal of federal enforcement action for alleged violations of its sewage treatment plant discharge permit, since EPA may proceed unilaterally to issue an administrative compliance order or to initiate a
civil suit. In United States v. Hudson Farms 107 a district court ruled that
failure to issue an abatement order under section}09(a)(3) does not entitle a
defendant to dismissal of an indictment in a federal criminal action for
alleged violations of the CW A, since the Administrator's duty to issue an
administrative order or to initiate civil action, even if a mandatory duty, is
not a prerequisite to bringing a criminal action. Similarly, in United States
v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. 108 another judge in the same district ruled that the
issuance of an order or the institution of a civil suit by the Administrator is
not a prerequisite to the filing of a criminal prosecution. The court also
ruled that defendant could be guilty of a violation of section 301(a) of the
CW A whether or not effluent standards applicable to the defendants had
been set, since they acknowledged that they neither had a permit under section 402 nor had they applied for one.
In United States v. Outboard Marine Corp. 109 a district court rules that
prior issuance of an administrative compliance order under section
309(a)(3) of theCW A does not bar commencement of a civil action at a
later point by the EPA under section 309(b). The court also noted that section 402(k) does not provide immunity from liability under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 for illegal discharges of polychlorinated biphenyls
'·'For reprint of full text see 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2011-2020.
, . , _ F. Supp. _.11 E.R.C. 2045 (D. S.C. 1978).
'·'12 E.R.C. 1329 (D. Colo. 1978).
'·'12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'·'12 E.R.C. 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'·'12 E.R.C. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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(PCBs) alleged to have occurred prior to the discharger's filing of an application for a section 402 permit. Finally, the court held the complaint sufficient in its allegation that the permit does not authorize Outboard Marine
to discharge PCBs where defendant's permit application represented that
no chlorinated hydrocarbons were contained in its discharge outfalls, and
the permit, as issued, was based on those representations. The complaint is
sufficient under those circumstances. The court held that defendant's
NPDES permit does not constitute a defense unless defendant is in compliance with it, a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
In an anomalous decision, a district court in United States v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp. "0 appeared to hold that Velsicol was guilty of discharging a
pollutant to navigable water in violation of its NPDES permit where it
discharged endrin and heptachlor to the city sewer system, but not directly
to "waters of the United States." These discharges were in violation of the
interim pretreatment standards for those pollutants set in its NPDES permit. It is not clear why Velsicol held an NPDES permit in the first place,
although perhaps it was because the court had previously entered an order
on January 6, 1976, denying Velsicol's motion to dismiss in which VeJsicol
argued that it discharged through the city system rather than directly into
waters of the United States. In the present opinion, the court set a civil
penalty of $30,000 for over 300 days of violation.

8. Judicial Review Developments
In Teneco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency'" the court construed the venue provisions of section 509, ruling that venue is proper in the
Fifth Circuit for judicial review under section 509(b)(1)(F) of an EPAissued NPDES permit despite the fact that none of the oil companies involved resides within the Fifth Circuit, since each transacts business within the
circuit. The court assumed that the venue provisions of section 509 will require, as does the general venue statute, that a corporation resides only at its
place of incorporation. The companies argued, however, that each "transacts such business" within the Fifth Circuit because its principal place of
business is within the circuit. EPA argued that "transacts such business"
refers only to operations directly affected by the Administrator's action, in
this case the off-shore oil platforms for which permits had been issued,
which were adjacent to areas outside the Fifth Circuit.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle'12 a district court
ruled that NRDC was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under section
505 (d) of the CW A in the litigation which resulted in the settlement agreement, noted earlier, concerning toxic pollutants, finding that the fees
claimed were in accordance with the prevailing local rate. The court refused
"°12 E.R.C. 1417 (W.O. Tenn. 1978).
11112 E.R.C. 1076 (5th Cir. 1978).
"'12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C. 1978).
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to allow NRDC attorneys' fees for opposing motions to intervene by third
parties in the litigation since the government also opposed intervention and
since award of attorneys' fees between nonadverse parties would contravene
the purpose of section 505(b) to encourage efficient enforcement of the
CW A. Third-party industries, who had successfully sought intervention as
defendants, were not allowed attorneys' fees since award of attorneys' fees
to voluntary intervenors would contravene the purpose of section
505(b)-which was to reimburse only defendants victimized by harrassing
and frivolous litigation.
Finally, in Homestake Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency"3 a mining company petition challenging EPA's denial of a request
for modification of an NPDES permit was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction where it was filed more than 90 days after EPA's denial. The court
essentially ruled that the 90-day period for review ran from date plaintiff's
request for modification was denied by EPA, not the date five days later on
which plaintiff received notice of the EPA decision. The court did not reach
EPA's argument that the 90-day period ran from the date the permit was
originally issued. EPA had argued that petitioner's request for modification
was not based solely upon grounds which arose after the ninetieth day after
the original permit issuance.

Part II
OTHER FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The pursuit of alternative energy sources received only sporadic encouragement over the past year. Coal proponents have been buoyed by the Interior
Department's move toward reopening the leasing of western federal coal
lands with the issuance late in 1978 of a draft environmental impact statement on a proposed new program for managing the production of such
coal. The government has not generally leased tracts in the West since 1971.
Even after these tracts are leased, however, the transportation of coal remains a problem. Innovative proposals such as the coal slurry pipeline have
not been favorably received. The House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs reported H.R. 1609, the Coal Pipeline Act of 1978, to the full
House for its consideration. The purpose was to facilitate the acquisition of
rights-of-way by coal slurry pipeline carriers. By the use of pumps a coal
slurry pipeline would carry large quantities of finely ground coal suspended
"'12 E.R.C. 1335 (8th Cir. 1978).
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